

CIA/RR-CB-61-48

S-E-C-R-E-T

St/p/c
Copy No. 28
13 September 1961

CURRENT SUPPORT BRIEF

CONSEQUENCES OF TURKEY GRANTING COMMERCIAL OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS TO THE USSR

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This report represents the immediate views of the originating intelligence components of the Office of Research and Reports. Comments are solicited.

W - A - R - N - I - N - G

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18 USC, Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONSEQUENCES OF TURKEY GRANTING COMMERCIAL OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS TO THE USSR

The Turkish Government recently advised the USSR that it is ready to grant commercial overflight rights to Aeroflot for flights between Moscow and Cairo, subject, however, to the signing of a bilateral air agreement between the two countries. Such an agreement may be signed in the near future. On 21 July Moscow filed a formal note for the airway, which would entail a corridor Inebolu-Ankara-Silifke. In January, when Moscow originally requested overflight rights, Turkey agreed to consultations with the US and delayed negotiations with the USSR. Recently, however, the Turkish Foreign Ministry expressed the view that Article XXIII of the Montreux Convention, which defines the conditions under which Turkey will grant overflight rights, required concurrence with the Soviet request. If permission were denied, the Ministry felt that the Soviets could demand renegotiation of the entire Convention with consequences undesirable for Turkey.^{1/} It appeared that Turkey was not concerned over the increased opportunity for Soviet aerial surveillance, and felt that with a US-USSR air agreement then in the offing, it could not reasonably hold out much longer.^{2/}

The first concrete result of a Soviet-Turkish air agreement would be a new direct route for Aeroflot between Moscow and Cairo, which would be shorter by about 710 miles than the present route by way of the southern European Satellites and Yugoslavia. In terms of flying time with the IL-18, the new route would save about one and three-quarters hours in each direction. Secondly, direct service to Baghdad could be inaugurated, and thence service could conveniently be extended to Dhahran, and to points along the east coast of Africa, such as Somalia and areas as far south as the Malagasy Republic. Such routes would greatly facilitate the travel of Soviet delegations to parts of Africa where the bloc's political and economic offensive is just getting under way.

The effect of this break in the restraining tier of countries --including Greece, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan--may be to weaken greatly the will of the other nations to continue ignoring Soviet overtures for overflight rights and bilateral commercial air pacts. In short, the USSR would have succeeded in demolishing one of the principal barriers to Soviet air communications with the Middle East and Africa. Turkey would receive reciprocal overflight rights, but these would not at present be of much value, as Turkey has no high-performance aircraft and nowhere to go involving a path across the USSR. A technical, but not a passenger stop at Ankara would be granted.

13 September 1961

CIA/RR-CB-61-48

Page 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1A

Analyst:



Sources:

1. State, Ankara, No. 240, 16 Aug 61. C.
2. State, Ankara, No. 268, 19 Aug 61. S.

Delete

13 September 1961

CIA/RR-CB-61-48

Page 3

S-E-C-R-E-T